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THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION IN
MONTANA: A WARNING AND SUGGESTIONS
Lester R. Rusoff*
Considerations relating to the marital deduction are central to estate
planning. Articles and speeches devote much time and space to the
problem of how best to use the deduction. Little is written or said,
however, about the possibility that state law may bar successful use
of some of the most commonly attempted forms of bequests. No difficulty
arises if a testator devises or bequeaths property outright to his spouse.
Often, however, he wishes to avoid such a devise and instead leaves
the property in trust. The trust may be an "estate trust" with an interest
for life in the surviving spouse and a remainder to her estate. It may
be a "power of appointment trust" with an interest for life in the sur-
viving spouse, an inter vivos or testamentary general power of appoint-
ment in her, and a remainder, in default of exercise of the power, in
someone else, typically issue of the testator. Arguably, however, neither
an estate trust nor a power of appointment trust with a testamentary
power can be created in Montana, under In re Doyle's Estate.1 If this
argument prevails, it interferes seriously with estate planning in Mon-
tana.
The purpose of this article is to bring the problems raised by Doyle's
Estate to the attention of lawyers in Montana and to suggest possible
ways to meet those problems. It is not useful, at this point, to attempt
a definitive statement of the law in Doyle's Estate. More complete
surveys of authority appear elsewhere.2
THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY DOYLE'S ESTATE
The problems arise under §2056(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code.3 That section provides that no deduction is allowed for an interest
passing to a surviving spouse if:
(1) the interest will end on the occurence or failure of an event
or contingency;
(2) an interest in the property passes or has passed, for less
than full consideration in money or money's worth, from
the decedent to any person other than the surviving spouse;
and,
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. A.B., Harvard College, 1940;
J.D., Harvard University, 1943; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1952.
'In re Doyle's Estate, 107 Mont. 64, 80 P.2d 373 (1938).
sAnnot., 10 A.L.R. 3d 483 (1966); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 2d 414 (1963); Fox, Estate: A
Word to be Used Cautiously, If at All, 81 HARv. L. REv. 992 (1968); Huston, Trans-
fers to the "estate" of a Named Person, 15 SYRACUSE L. Rrv. 463 (1964).
8 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1). [hereinafter cited as INT. REV. CODE
O' 1954.]
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(3) because of the passing of the interest to such other person,
he may possess or enjoy any part of the property after the
end of the interest passing to the surviving spouse.
This is the "terminable interest" rule. It causes no trouble for the
client who wants to leave the qualifying gift outright to the surviving
spouse, but it creates a problem for the client who wants the surviving
spouse to have, as nearly as possible, only a life estate. If the survivor
has only a life estate, the three conditions of § 2056(b) (1) are not met,
and the decedent's estate does not get the marital deduction.
THE ESTATE TRUST
One device for avoiding the terminable interest rule is the estate
trust. A will creating such a trust typically gives the surviving spouse
an interest for life, with a remainder to her estate. The will may give
the trustee discretion to accumulate income or to pay it to the surviving
spouse. It may empower the trustee to hold unproductive assets. 4 Al-
though these features limit enjoyment by the surviving spouse, they do
not result in denial of the deduction, because, presumably, no interest
passes to any person other than the surviving spouse.
Unfortunately, in Montana a bequest to an estate trust may not
qualify for the marital deduction. The difficulty arises from Doyle's
Estate.5 Under this case, the remainder in the estate of the surviving
spouse may be invalid. The remainder in the trust may then pass, in
whole or in part, to persons other than the surviving spouse, and the
marital deduction may be denied.
The bequest to an estate, in Doyle's Estate, was in itself unimportant,
but arguably the court's treatment of it seriously affected the distri-
bution of the residue.
The testatrix, Miss Doyle, left legacies of $5,000 to $10,000 to her
four living brothers and sisters. She also made specific legacies to
friends and to descendants of her living brothers and sisters. She left
five dollars to the estate of a deceased sister and five dollars to the
estate of a deceased brother. She left fifty dollars to the estate of an-
other deceased brother, John, "as his share of my estate as heir or
otherwise." Children of John survived him. Her residuary clause stated
"all the rest and remainder shall be divided between my lawful heirs
herein mentioned to share and share alike."
The issue in Doyle's Estate was whether the children of John, the
deceased brother, should share in the residue. The court cited several
cases as holding that a legacy to the estate of a deceased person 'is
void because an estate is not an entity capable of taking by will. It
also cited several cases upholding bequests to estates of deceased persons.
4Fox, supra note 2 at 1006.
Oin re Doyle 's Estate, supra note 1.
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It treated as critical in the latter cases the question of whether the
court could determine the intention of the testator as to the identity
of his intended beneficiaries. The court concluded that it could not
decide whom the testatrix intended to receive the fifty dollars she left
to the estate of John. It added "If she intended this legacy to be dis-
tributed to the children of John Doyle, they are not mentioned in the
will, and unless so mentioned they are not among those included as
beneficiaries in the residuary clause of the will."6 Thus, the children
of John did not share in the residue.
The decision in Doyle's Estate has three possible bases:
(1) A bequest to the estate of a deceased person is void.
(2) A bequest to the estate of a deceased person is void unless the
court can determine whom the testator intended to take the
bequest.
(3) Regardless of the validity of the bequest of fifty dollars,
the children of John Doyle may not share in the residue
because the will did not "mention" them.
Thus, Doyle's Estate creates a problem for the tax planner who
wishes to use an estate trust. If a bequest to an estate is void, perhaps
an estate trust cannot be used. Perhaps it can be used only if a drafts-
man makes clear that he is not providing a bequest to an estate but
using "estate" as shorthand for the persons to whom he means the
property to pass. If a bequest to an estate is void only in the absence
of evidence of the testator's meaning, a draftsman can supply the mean-
ing. Counsel who has to try, in litigation, to uphold a bequest to an
estate, without benefit of explanation in the will, has a difficult task,
because there may be no other admissible evidence. The problem faced
by such counsel is discussed below.
THE PowER OF APPOINTMENT TRUST
Because of the difficulties raised by Doyle's Estate in respect to
estate trusts, a tax planner may consider using a power of appointment
trust. An estate trust, as indicated above, avoids the terminable interest
rule and qualifies, hopefully, for the marital deduction, because it in-
volves no interest in anyone other than the surviving spouse. In an
estate trust there is no terminable interest. A typical power of appoint-
ment trust, however, does involve a terminable interest but falls within
a specific exception to the terminable interest rule. The exception and
the necessary features of a power of appointment trust appear in
§2056(b) (5).7 These features, somewhat simplified, are: a right to
income for life in the surviving spouse and a power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the corpus in her favor, in favor of her estate, or in
Old. at 376.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
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favor of either. Apart from § 2056(b) (5), the interest of a surviving
spouse in a trust with these features would be a terminable interest and
would not qualify for the marital deduction. The reason is that the
interest given the surviving spouse is a life estate and will terminate on
the event of the death of the surviving spouse. Section 2056(b) (5), how-
ever, provides that if these features exist, no interest shall be considered
as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse, for the pur-
pose of § 2056(b) (1) (A). Thus, the trust qualifies for the marital de-
duction.
For non-tax reasons, the draftsman of a power of appointment trust
will commonly provide a bequest in default of appointment by the sur-
viving spouse. The existence of such a bequest is not necessary to qualify
the trust for the marital deduction nor does it result in denial of the
deduction.s
Doyle's Estate may bar the use in Montana not only of an estate
trust but also of a power of appointment trust. The draftsman of a
power of appointment trust may wish to give the surviving spouse only
a testamentary power of appointment. If so, he must, under § 2056 (b) (5),
give her power to appoint in favor of her estate. Doyle's Estate may be
taken to hold that a bequest to the estate of another is void. It may
also lead to the same conclusion as to a bequest to the estate of the
testator and as to an appointment to the estate of the testator. Even a
remote possibility of such a result justifies careful planning and drafting.
Assuming the worst about testamentary powers, what about using
an inter vivos power? First, a client may not want his widow to have
such a power. Second, an inter vivos power must be drafted carefully,
to make sure that it is sufficiently broad. The Code requires that the
power be exercisable by the surviving spouse "alone and in all events."'
The regulations interpret this as meaning that exercise of the power
must be unrestricted; if the power is one to consume, it must not be only
a power to use for the spouse's support. She must be able to use all or
any part of the appointive property and be able to dispose of it in any
manner, with power to dispose of it by gift.10 A court may hold that a
power to consume, though broadly stated, must be exercised in good
faith and that a spouse with such a power cannot appoint to herself.,'
A draftsman, therefore, should provide expressly that the wife may
appoint to herself, free of trust, and may make gifts of the appointive
property.12
There is an even more dismal possibility. A decision by the Second
Circuit may be interpreted as indicating that an inter vivos power, with-
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(2) (1954).
OINT. REV. CODE 01 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
10Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1954).
"Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1960).
'For the phrase, "free of trust"', see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (2) (1954).
[Vol. 34
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out a testamentary power, cannot satisfy § 2056(b) (5). 13 The will con-
sidered in that case conferred "absolute right of full disposition and use
of the whole or any part of said income or principal .. .except that
she shall have no power over the disposition of such part thereof as
remains unexpended at the time of her death. ' 14 The case in question
can be distinguished, and it is difficult to believe that a court would
really hold that no solely inter vivos power can be sufficient. Section
2056(b) (5) seems to bar such a holding: it refers to a power "exercisable
in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving
spouse, or in favor of either." The regulations, at several points, suggest
that either an inter vivos power or a testamentary power may be suf-
ficent.15 Regulations stating the requirements for an inter vivos power
conclude "(whether or not she has power to dispose of it by will)."'1
There is also the statement: "[I]f she has an unlimited power of with-
drawal, she may have a limited testamentary power."'17 Another state-
ment indicates that the power in the surviving spouse must fall "within
one of the following categories," these categories being a power exer-
cisable in her own favor and a power exercisable in favor of her estate.'8
Thus, the possibility that no inter vivos power alone is sufficient for a
qualifying power of appointment trust seems remote.
OTHER TAx PROBLEMS ARISING FROM DoYLE's ESTATE
Section 2056(b) (5) is not the only provision of the Internal Revenue
Code which speaks of interests passing or appointable to an estate. Others
include §§ 2037(b), 2041(b)(1), 2042(2), 2056(b)(6), 2503(c)(2)(B),
2514(c) and 2523(e).19 In connection with some of these sections, it is
beneficial to the taxpayer for the term "estate" to be operative under
state law. See, for example, § 2503(c), which makes the annual gift tax
exclusion available for certain gifts to minors, if the property is payable
to the estate of the minor if he dies under the age of twenty-one.
One may not argue that, because Congress has spoken of an "estate"
in speaking of transferees or appointees, transfers or appointments to
estates must be possible. Congress, of course, has the power to state
what interests in property are taxable or deductible. State law, how-
ever, determines what interests in property a person has.20 If under
state law a bequest to an estate is void, that bequest has no consequences
uEstate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1956); J. HUSTON, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATiON, 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN L w 201 (1962).
11Id. at 211.
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1), (3), (5), (1954).
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(3) (1954).
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (5) (1954).
IsTreas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(1) (1954).
"For discussion of the use of "estate" in the Internal Revenue Code, see Huston, supra
note 2 at 464.
21G. STEPHENS AND R MAXFIELD, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, 52 (2d ed.
1967).
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for purposes of federal taxes.21 Doyle's Estate, then, raises a number
of problems for tax planners in Montana.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY
DOYLE'S ESTATE
The problems raised by Doyle's Estate and the legal and practical
problems that arise in trying to avoid it by using inter vivos powers
seem serious enough to consider all possible ways of meeting them: in
litigation, in drafting, and in seeking legislative relief.
LITIGATION
If a case involving a bequest to an estate or a power to appoint to
an estate comes before the Supreme Court of Montana in the future, the
court may sweep away the difficulties arising from Doyle's Estate. It
may treat Doyle's Estate as based primarily on the ground that the claim-
ants were not "mentioned" in the will. Then the court can consider
afresh the effect of a bequest to an estate.
Counsel might argue that an estate is an entity and that therefore
a testator can make a bequest to an estate. The United States Tax
Court has said "[A]n estate is a separate legal and taxable entity."2 2
Although the federal tax law does treat an estate as a taxable entity,23
general acceptance of this proposition seems doubtful. 24 Moreover, Re-
vised Codes of Montana, §91-104 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
1947], which lists permissible legatees and devisees, includes no category
into which an estate, as an entity, can fall. Hence, this approach comes
to a dead end.
Success may be achieved by arguing that the meaning of "estate"
depends on the intent of the testator and that his intent is ascertainable.
The Montana court in Doyle's Estate appears to have accepted the
general proposition that intent governs but it refused to find, from the
will or extrinsic evidence, that the intent of Miss Doyle was ascertain-
able. It seems doubtful that specific evidence of intent will appear in
cases like Doyle's Estate, unless the draftsman of the will foresaw the
problem and included a definition of "estate." Hopefully, if given an-
other opportunity, the court will try to put itself into the shoes of
the "average testator" and adopt a presumption that such a testator
would mean that the property should go to the persons who take the
named party's own property passing by will or intestacy, as the case
may be.25 Specific evidence of intent would then be unnecessary.
"Whether, in a given case, state law is determined by a state court or a federal court
seems irrelevant, since it is the state law that either court finds. Thus, Doyle's Estate
must be dealt with, regardless of whether the litigation is in state or federal court.
nernie C. Clinard, 40 T.C. 878, 881 (1963).
OINT. REV. CODE o 1954. § 641.
2
1L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 351 (2d ed. 1956); Huston,
supra note 2 at 464.
2'SIMES AND SMITH, supra note 24.
[Vol. 34
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 34 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/2
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
There are cases which have upheld bequests to an estate. Several
courts have held that "estate" means the persons who would take the
property of the named person, under his will or by intestacy.26 One
of these cases27 stressed the doctrine that a will should be construed
to give effect to every word; this doctrine is stated in R.C.M. 1947,
§91-209. Other cases have said that "estate," in a provision in favor of
the estate of a person, refers to his property but have, nevertheless, let
the property pass to those who would take his property by will or
intestacy.28 One weakness in relying on these cases is that the Montana
court cited several of them in Doyle's Estate29 but did not follow them.
Perhaps a second thought and consideration of a more recent case would
lead to a different result.8 0
Assuming that the Montana court is willing to interpret "estate"
as referring to the persons who take the testate or intestate property of a
named person, the court will next face the problem of identifying them.
This problem arises because the testator did not name them in a properly
signed and attested will. It seems doubtful that a court will have trouble
with this problem if the person to whose estate the bequest is made died
intestate and his heirs are to be identified by reference to R.C.M. 1947,
§91-403 and such extrinsic evidence as is necessary to identify the takers
under that statute. A court may be more hesitant if reference must be
made to the will of the named person. Such hesitation should not be
fatal. A court should be able to identify the proper persons by using
the doctrine of incorporation by reference, the doctrine relating to facts
of independent significance, or the doctrine of Matter of Fowles.81 Other
possibilities are treating the provision as one creating a power of appoint-
ment or, in the case of an estate trust, simply as a bequest or devise to
the named person. 82 The doctrine of incorporation by reference does not
fit some of the typical situations, because the testator did not intend
to incorporate any particular will of the other party or because the
other party's will did not exist when the testator made his will.3 This
is likely to be the case with respect to bequests meant to qualify for the
marital deduction. That deduction is not available if the legatee dies
first. Also, it would be risky not to allow the property to pass under
the last will of the surviving spouse, whenever executed.8 4
"In re Brunet's Estate, 34 Cal.2d 105, 207 P.2d 567 (1949) ; Reid v. Neal, 182 N.C. 192,
108 S.E. 769 (1921); Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W.Va. 296, 73 S.E. 930 (1912).
In Arnett, there was some evidence from the will of the testatrix which tended to sup-
port the conclusion, but Reid and Brunet disclose nothing very specific.
2'Reid v. Neal, supra note 26 at 772.
Downing v. Grigsby, 251 Ill. 568, 96 N.E. 513 (1911); Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272
Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828 (1930).
2Doyle 's Estate, supra note 1 at 67. The cases cited were Leary, Arnett, and Reid, supra
note 26.
*In re Brunet's Estate, supra note 26, is a more recent case.
uMatter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918); Huston, supra note 2 at 469.
For help with the various doctrines mentioned in this paragraph, see T. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OP TH. LAW oF WILLs, 385-400 (2d ed. 1953).
wFox, supra note 2 at 1012.
0E.g., Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828, 830 (1930).
aSTEPEMNS AND MAXFIEID, supra note 20 at 213-214.
19731
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The most generally applicable doctrine that can be used to identify
the beneficiaries of another's estate seems to be that relating to facts of
independent significance. The other's will disposes of his own property
and appoints his own executor, typically, so it does have significance
independent of its function of completing the will of the testator. The
time he executed his will and whether the testator's will refers to it are
immaterial under this doctrine.
LEGISLATION
Depending on litigation to solve the problems raised by Doyle's
Estate seems undesirable. We don't know when, if ever, a case dealing
with those problems will be litigated through the Supreme Court of
Montana. Nor can we predict whether the court will settle those problems
in a manner conducive to obtaining the marital deduction. Even if there
is litigation and it has a favorable outcome, the draftsman, in the mean-
time, faces uncertainty as to what devices he should use and as to how
he should draft them.
Therefore, the bar may be wise to seek a legislative solution. Two
approaches are possible. A new and separate section may be added to
the Codes, or an existing section can be amended. If a new section is
added, it may state a rebuttable presumption that, if an inter vivos in-
strument or a will purports to create a gift, bequest, or devise to the
estate of a named person, the donor or testator intends the property to
be used or to pass as does the property owned by the named person, and
thus to go to persons with enforceable claims against the estate of the
named person, to pass to his devisees and legatees if he dies intestate,
or to pass to his successors under R.C.M. 1947, § 91-403 if he dies inte-
state. The section should also state a rebuttable presumption that, if an
inter vivos instrument or a will purports to create a power in a named
person to appoint to his estate, the donor or testator intends the named
person to be able to exercise the power in favor of any persons, including
persons with enforceable claims against his estate, persons to whom he
might devise or bequeath his own property and his intestate successors.
Perhaps the provision dealing with powers of appointment needs only
to refer to persons to whom the donee of the power can devise or be-
queath his own property, since he can devise or bequeath his own prop-
erty to his creditors or to his heirs.3 5 Caution suggests, however, that
the provision refer expressly to creditors and heirs, to make as clear as
possible that the donee of the power may exercise the power in favor
of anyone to whom his own property might pass.
8IThis assumes that there is no testamentary branch of the doctrine of worthier title to
interfere with a devise or bequest to an heir. For short discussions of that doctrine,
See, W. SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 113-117 (1965) and L.
SIMES, LAW OP FUTURE INTERESTS 57 (1966). There appear to be no Montana cases
dealing with the doctrine of worthier title, and R.C.M. 1947, § 67-520 probably abolishes
only the rule in Shelly's case.
[Vol. 34
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 34 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/2
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Instead of adding a new section to the Codes, the bar may seek
to amend one or more existing sections. This approach may be more
difficult than drafting an entirely new section. Also, it carries the pos-
possiblity that the amended section, perhaps because of some aspect of
it that is overlooked in the revision, will not make sense or will lead to
an undesirable result. For example, R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218 might be chosen
to carry the new explanation of "estate." That section now defines a
number of terms, including "heirs," "relations," and "issue." It states
that they refer to the intestate successors of a named person. Thus,
R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218 already fails to make sense; taken literally, it says
that "issue" means intestate successors. If applied literally, it would
pass a bequest to a person's issue to his brothers and sisters if they
were in fact his intestate successors. The legislative draftsman probably
meant that, if there is a gift to "issue," the gift goes to those of the
named person's issue, if any, who would be his intestate successors.
Thus, his children, if all survive, would take to the exclusion of his
grandchildren. The point is that R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218 already covers
too much to do it well.
Use of R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218 would create another problem. It de-
fines the listed terms by reference to the chapter on succession. That
evidently means Chapter 4 of Title 91 and, more specifically, R.C.M. 1947,
§91-403, which identifies takers by intestate succession. If "estate" were
so defined, an attempted estate trust probably would not qualify for
the marital deduction, because the remainder would be in the surviving
spouse's heirs as purchasers. It would not be part of her estate subject
to claims and to distribution under her will. Similarly, in the case of a
power of appointment trust with power to appoint by will to the sur-
viving spouse's estate, the power would be only a power to appoint among
heirs, not a power to appoint to the estate of the surviving spouse, as the
term "estate" is used in the Internal Revenue Code, and the trust would
not qualify for the marital deduction. 30 Thus, if R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218
were used as the vehicle for change, the amendment would have to do
more than add "estate" to the list of terms defined. It would have to
add language indicating that the property could be used to pay claims
against the estate or to satisfy bequests and devises. Thus, amending
R.C.M. 1947, § 91-218 seems clearly inferior to drafting a new provision.
Another existing section that could be used to make a statutory
definition of "estate" is R.C.M. 1947, § 91-104, which lists permissible
devisees and legatees. It would be possible to add an item "(i)" to that
section to read "(i) To an estate of a named person." Then it would
probably be necessary to add a definition of "estate." Because R.C.M.
1947, § 91-104 is all one sentence except for the last two lines, the defini-
"See, Bernie C. Clinard, supra note 22, dealing with INT. REV. CODE O 1954, § 2503 (c).
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tion of "estate" probably would not be made part of item "(i)" but
would be a separate sentence and paragraph inserted just before the
last two lines.
If the choice is to prepare an entirely new section to define "estate"
instead of relying solely on an amendment to an existing section, it may
still be desirable to amend R.C.M. 1947, § 91-104 to list, as item "(i)"
"To an estate of a named or otherwise designated person, as defined in
section 91- ............" This should not be necessary, since the definition
of "estate" in the proposed new section would not really be indicating
that an "estate" is an entity but merely indicating to what persons it
refers. Those persons should already qualify as acceptable legatees under
R.C.M. 1947, § 91-104. Making the addition to R.C.M. 1947, § 91-104 may,
however, be a desirable precaution, to forestall any argument based on
a supposed conflict between the proposed new section and R.C.M. 1947,
§ 91-104.
DRAFTiNG
Pending a solution by litigation or legislation, counsel face the
problem of drafting wills with bequests and devises intended to qualify
for the marital deduction. The safest and simplest provision would leave
the qualifying property outright to the surviving spouse. A slightly
less simple provision, suggested by Professor Huston, would place the
property in trust for the surviving spouse for life, with a remainder
to her rather than to her estate.8 7 Deliberately creating a remainder in
a person who will be dead when the remainder vests in possession seems
odd, but it ought to work. Presumably, a bequest does not fail if the
legatee survives the testator but dies before the time for distribution.
There also may be some precedent in the cases dealing with devises
to a named person for life, with a remainder to the heirs of the testator.
The life tenant sometimes is the sole heir or one of the heirs of the
testator. If the court decides that the testator used "heirs" in its technical
sense as referring to his intestate successors as of the time of his death,
the life tenant takes or shares in the remainder, even though she is
dead when it vests in possession. 8
Another possibility is defining "estate" so as to make the remainder
in an estate trust or the power in a power of appointment trust suf-
ficiently broad. In the case of an estate trust, the testator may state,
after providing for the life estate in the surviving spouse, that: "At her
death, the trustee shall transfer the corpus, including any accumulated
income, to her executor or administrator to be administered as part of
UHuston, supra note 2 at 485-486.
asGilman v. Congregational Home Missionary Society, 276 Mass. 580, 177 N.E. 621
(1931). The fact that in such cases the courts do not always give "heirs" its techni-
cal meaning is irrelevant.
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the property which she may leave at her death."39 In the case of a power
of appointment trust, the testator may state that on the death of the
income beneficiary,
the trustee shall transfer the corpus to such person or persons
as (the income beneficiary) shall appoint by will. (The income bene-
ficiary) may exercise this power in favor of any person or persons,
natural or otherwise, to whom a valid bequest or devise may be made.
Although I do not intend to exclude other possibilities, I do intend
that (the income beneficiary) may appoint the corpus to her exe-
cutor or administrator to be administered as part of the property
which she may leave at her death.
A leading article dealing with the word "estate" suggests another
form for use with an estate trust.40 That form explains a provision for
payment to the estate of the income beneficiary as meaning that, if she
dies testate, the property shall be paid to her executors subject to the
claims of creditors, debts and expenses of administration, and taxes; and
that the balance shall be distributed to the persons to whom she shall
bequeath it and, in the absence of specific bequests, to her residuary
legatees; and that, if she dies intestate, the property shall go to her
administrators subject to the claims of her creditors, etc. and the balance
shall pass to her intestate successors. This form seems workable, except
that, instead of providing that "in the absence of a specific bequest"
the property shall pass to residuary legatees, it might be better to pro-
vide that, if she does not devise or bequeath the property specifically
and if it is not needed to satisfy her general bequests, it shall pass to
her residuary legatees. Probably the writer did not intend to use the
words "specific bequest" technically, but other language may be better,
to make clear that the income beneficiary may use the property to
satisfy specific, general or residuary bequests, just as if it were her own.
CONCLUSION
It appears, then, that Doyle's Estate creates a serious problem for
estate planners in Montana but that the problem may be solved, with
careful attention to litigation, legislation, and drafting.
This language is suggested by the opinion in Coghlan v. Supreme Conclave Improved
Order Heptasophs, 86 N.J.L. 41, 91 A. 132-133 (1914).
'0Fox, mupra note 2 at 1013-1014.
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